

**Electa**  
**ESAT**

# A fault-tolerant info'structure for energy applications

**Geert Deconinck**  
K.U.Leuven – ESAT – ELECTA  
15 Nov. 2006



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



**Overview**

**IS&T**

- introduction
- separating functionality & fault tolerance
- overlay network
- application example
- conclusion

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**Electra** **KU Leuven** **Embedded automation**

- opportunities for autonomous, decentralised
  - more flexibility
- vulnerabilities
  - fault propagation
  - interdependencies

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**Electra** **KU Leuven** **Requires methodology & architecture**

- methodology
  - risk analysis
  - dependability specification
  - modelling & simulation

→ architecture at middleware level

- between OS and application
- on heterogeneous platform
- distributed, decentralised
- for *dependable control* of power grid
  - survivability, self-healing, fault-tolerance, ...
  - redundancy & diversity

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**Electra** **KU Leuven** **Research questions...**

- communication architecture
  - point-to-point, multicasting, broadcasting
  - time-triggered, event-triggered
  - push, pull
- interoperability
  - communication protocols
    - IEC61850, TASE.2 (ICCP), DNP3, IEC 60870, OPC...
  - vendor-independence, open, ...

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**Electra** **KU Leuven** **Research questions (cont.)**

- dynamic aspects
  - different time scales
    - power electronics: sub-cycle
    - contingency: cycles .. seconds
    - economic optimisation: minutes .. hours
- dependability aspects
  - fault and failure models?
  - reliable communication
    - on top of unreliable infrastructure
  - different quality-of-service requirements

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
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**Summarizing dependability requirements of info'structure**

- generic design
  - take advantage of same architecture
  - modular, composable
- fault tolerance
  - reconfiguration, self-testing & recovery abilities
  - separation of fault management from application
  - scalable fault management
    - using a hierarchical structure, i.e. an intra/inter-site hierarchy



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**TIRAN/DepAuDE framework approach**


- middleware (implemented in C)
  - basic services layer (BSL)
    - communication: group, local, remote, tunneled, ...
    - task / node management: start, stop, inform, ...
  - library of FTM (fault tolerance mechanisms)
    - detection, monitoring, masking, recovery, ...
  - backbone (distributed application + database)
    - collects information (from appl, FTM, BSL)
    - orchestrates recovery (coordination of FTM)
- ARIEL language
  - for configuration of middleware
  - for expression of recovery scripts

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**Middleware architecture**



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## ARIEL as recovery language

- check if entity ...
  - faulty?, isolated?, stopped?, running?, ...
  - ERN(e), ERRT(e), PHASE(e)
  - expressions: ==, !=, ||, &&, !, ...
- then actions ...
  - stop! isolate! start! reboot! enable! send! ...
- metacharacters
  - task@: tasks for which guard is true
    - IF [ FAULTY group1] THEN STOP@1
  - task~: tasks for which guard is false

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
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## Modifying recovery strategies


3-and-a-spare system:

```
IF [ -FAULTY group1 ] THEN
  STOP task@1
  WARN task~1
  START task4
FI
```



graceful degradation:

```
IF [ -FAULTY group1 ] THEN
  STOP task@1
  WARN task~1
FI
```



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## ARIEL as configuration tool

- configuration of basic tools
  - error detection, fault masking, isolation, recovery
  - templates for voting, recovery blocks, watchdogs, ...
- e.g.: replication (3-modular redundancy)
 

```
REPLICATED task10 IS task101, task102, task103
  MULTICAST IS ATOMIC
  METHOD IS MODULAR REDUNDANCY
  VOTING ALGORITHM IS MAJORITY
  METRIC "int_cmp"
END METHOD
ON SUCCESS task20
ON ERROR task30
END REPLICATED
```




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## Advantage: uncouple recovery from application

- modify FT strategy w/o changing application
  - 3-and-a-spare vs. degrading voting farm vs. ...
- complexity ↓, maintainability ↑
- allows local & distributed recovery strategies



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**Assumptions**

- fault and failure assumptions
  - single physical faults
  - fail-silent failures
  - fault containment region: task or node
    - depending on HW & RTOS
- synchronous system model
  - known & bounded
    - processing delay
    - communication delay
    - clock differences / clock drift
  - corresponds to instantiation on dedicated system
    - no dynamic task creation

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**Assumption coverage**

- assumption coverage < 1
  - depending on instantiation on specific HW/RTOS
- optional mechanisms increase coverage
  - crash failure semantics
  - group-based communication, atomic multicast, ...
  - e.g. perfect communication, at OSI level 5
    - i.e.
    - no lost messages, no duplicates, keeping message order
  - but
    - CRC + level 2 retransmission (Ethernet)
    - BSL: ACK-management

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**Framework implementation**


- on embedded hardware / TCP/IP stack
  - RT network with SBC & PC
    - RTOS: QNX, WinCE, VxWorks, RMOS32
    - GPP OS: Linux, WinNT
- applications
  - DepAuDE applications
    - heterogeneous substation control system
    - airfield lighting automation system
  - info'structure for distr. PQ meas. & control
    - dynamic topology: remove/reintegrate nodes
    - robust communication: protocols & inforedund.



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**Recovery sets & actions**

- recovery sets
  - recovery actions
    - recovery set RS<sub>1</sub>
    - recovery set RS<sub>2</sub>
    - recovery set RS<sub>3</sub>
    - recovery action RA<sub>1,1</sub>
    - recovery action RA<sub>1,2</sub>
    - recovery action RA<sub>1,3</sub>
    - ...
- based on resource / environment monitoring
  - selecting recovery actions
    - resource awareness
  - switching recovery sets/strategies
    - environment awareness
    - adaptation of QoS to environment conditions
      - graceful degradation

```

graph TD
    EC[environmental conditions] --> SRS[Switch to appropriate recovery set RSi]
    SRS --> EDR[error detection available resources]
    EDR --> EA[Execute appropriate recovery actions from RSi]
    EA --> SRS
    SRS --> L1[loop 1]
    L1 --> SRS
    L1 --> L2[loop 2]
    L2 --> EA
  
```

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**Measurement-based adaptation**

```

graph LR
    Env[environment] --> Meas[measurement]
    Meas --> Anal[analysis]
    Anal --> Act[actions]
    Act --> Res[results]
  
```

Composite Indicator (CI)

% Processor time

Available memory (MB)

# Reboots

Threshold (s)

low max high

th<sub>11</sub> th<sub>12</sub> th<sub>13</sub> th<sub>21</sub> th<sub>22</sub> th<sub>23</sub>

63 8 1 0

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**CI implementation**


- parameters sampled
  - CPU usage
  - available memory
  - # reboots (up time)
- thresholds from literature
- OS-dependent
  - Win NT/2000/XP, QNX Neutrino RTOS, GNU/Linux
- example CI generation
  - c=3 counters, t=2 thresholds
    - CI=0 - normal state
    - CI>0 & CI <=7 ( $<=2^{c-1}$ ) - transient alert state
    - CI>7 ( $>2^{c-1}$ ) - transient alarm state
  - ADC -Alarm Duration Counter if  $> \Delta T$  triggers
    - alarm state» alarm recovery set (switch of recovery set)

Alarm threshold passed			Alert threshold passed		
Memory	CPU	reboot	Memory	CPU	Reboot
1	0	0	1	1	0

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
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**Energy info's structure requirements**

- energy applications: unbounded systems
  - generator
    - name
    - type
    - rating
    - generation percent
- set
  - generator
    - groups similar entities
  - XML description for entities
    - attribute based addressing
  - requires resource discovery
  - adapts over time



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**Semantic Overlay Networks**

- agora: a semantic overlay network
  - small-world overlay network
  - self-organising
  - Small-world networks**
    - small diameter (best of random graphs)

<b>Group locality</b> nodes work in groups 	<b>Time locality</b> nodes request same resource frequently 
--	---

cluster by functionality

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**EntityDescription**

```

<entityDescription>
  <description>
    <deviceSegment>Arenberg-ESAT</deviceSegment>
    <electricalDeviceType>
  </description>
  <description>
    <segment>Arenberg-ESAT</segment>
    <electricalDeviceType>
      <transformer/>
    </electricalDeviceType>
  </description>

```

0.6

```

<description>
  <segment>Arenberg-ESAT</segment>
  <electricalDeviceType>
    <generator>
      <photovoltaic/>
    </generator>
  </electricalDeviceType>
</description>
<ElectricalDevice>
  <powerInW>100</powerInW>
</ElectricalDevice>

```

**semantic distance**

- metric reflection

$$\delta(u,v) = 1 - \frac{\text{size}}{\text{size}}$$

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**Links from Agora nodes**

- companion links
  - to the semantically closest nodes
  - provide group locality support
- pupil links
  - to nodes semantically closest to expressions of interest
  - provide time locality support
- far links
  - link to the semantically furthest node
  - all nodes have 50% probability for far link
  - prevent network partitioning and reduces diameter
  - effectuate small world topology

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**Node convergence**

- nodes periodically converge
  - = send requests for better neighbours
  - handle dynamic environment
- requests are forwarded in the overlay
  - to the semantically closest area
  - several request strategies have been designed and evaluated

```

graph TD
    Start(( )) --> Send[Send neighbour requests]
    Send --> Wait[Wait for and process answers]
    Wait -- "convergence detected" --> Sleep[Sleep]
    Wait -- "no convergence detected" --> Send
  
```

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**To summarise**

- nodes periodically converge
- converge
  - companions
  - pupils
  - far links
- announce
  - optimise convergence
  - handle dynamism

Group locality  
Time locality  
Small world  
Agora semantic networks provide a basic control- & data-infrastructure for unbounded systems

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**Semantic routing**

messages are forwarded to the neighbour semantically closest to the destination's description

= heuristic depth-first search with cycle-checking and without back-tracking

can be used to implement attribute-based RD supporting dynamic and mobile resource

Semantic distance used as heuristic

Edge	Weight
1-2	0.8
2-3	0.75
3-4	0.2
4-5	0.4
5-2	0.3
2-1	0.2
1-4	0.15

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**Evaluation: AEN**  
autonomous electricity networks

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**Experiments**

- 4 converters operating as generators
- island operation

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
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**Fault tolerance: Embedded controllers require robust system architecture**

- to deal with
  - internal problems
    - physical faults in controllers or communication
  - external dynamic environment
    - changing interconnection topology
    - bandwidth reduction
- to exploit redundancy & diversity
  - in interconnections and resources
- for quantitative & qualitative assessment
  - explicit fault and failure model
  - dependability, time & cost constraints

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**Design methodology for dependable embedded systems**

- explicit fault and failure models of ICT infrastructure
- dependability modeling
  - reliability, safety, ...
  - fault prevention, ~tolerance, ~removal, ~prediction
- instantiation of modular middleware architecture
  - dependable communication & computation
  - in dynamic environments
- assessment of dependability, time & cost constraints
  - conceptual evaluation and fault injection
  - interdependencies on other critical infrastructures
    - energy, telecom, information & fault propagation


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**Outlook**  
**ICT: key for critical infrastructures**

- survivability of infrastructures
  - self-healing, autonomous system architecture
    - diversity for reduced vulnerability
  - middleware for heterogeneous, distributed systems
    - adaptive, reconfigurable in dynamic environment
    - interoperability
- assessment
  - infrastructure vulnerability / interdependency
    - fault propagation
  - performability evaluation of real applications
    - service point-of-view: end-to-end properties
    - focusing on interconnection of subsystems

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**Conclusion**

- context
  - new **threats** and vulnerabilities emerge from tight **coupling** of power - info infrastructures and from evolving **control** systems
- vision
  - **resilient** power control *in spite of* threats to their information infrastructures
- projects
  - [crutial.cesiricerca.it](http://crutial.cesiricerca.it)
  - [grid.jrc.it](http://grid.jrc.it)
  - [www.kuleuven.be/esat/electa](http://www.kuleuven.be/esat/electa)

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